$NetBSD: patch-XSA439,v 1.1 2023/11/15 15:59:36 bouyer Exp $ From d7b78041dc819efde0350f27754a61cb01a93496 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrew Cooper Date: Wed, 30 Aug 2023 20:24:25 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 1/1] x86/spec-ctrl: Mitigate the Zen1 DIV leakage In the Zen1 microarchitecure, there is one divider in the pipeline which services uops from both threads. In the case of #DE, the latched result from the previous DIV to execute will be forwarded speculatively. This is an interesting covert channel that allows two threads to communicate without any system calls. In also allows userspace to obtain the result of the most recent DIV instruction executed (even speculatively) in the core, which can be from a higher privilege context. Scrub the result from the divider by executing a non-faulting divide. This needs performing on the exit-to-guest paths, and ist_exit-to-Xen. Alternatives in IST context is believed safe now that it's done in NMI context. This is XSA-439 / CVE-2023-20588. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich (cherry picked from commit b5926c6ecf05c28ee99c6248c42d691ccbf0c315) --- docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc | 6 +++- xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/entry.S | 1 + xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h | 3 +- xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h | 17 ++++++++++ 5 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc index 16a61ad858..f3d1009f2d 100644 --- docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc.orig +++ docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc @@ -2189,7 +2189,7 @@ By default SSBD will be mitigated at runtime (i.e `ssbd=runtime`). > {msr-sc,rsb,md-clear,ibpb-entry}=|{pv,hvm}=, > bti-thunk=retpoline|lfence|jmp, {ibrs,ibpb,ssbd,psfd, > eager-fpu,l1d-flush,branch-harden,srb-lock, -> unpriv-mmio,gds-mit}= ]` +> unpriv-mmio,gds-mit,div-scrub}= ]` Controls for speculative execution sidechannel mitigations. By default, Xen will pick the most appropriate mitigations based on compiled in support, @@ -2309,6 +2309,10 @@ has elected not to lock the configuration, Xen will use GDS_CTRL to mitigate GDS with. Otherwise, Xen will mitigate by disabling AVX, which blocks the use of the AVX2 Gather instructions. +On all hardware, the `div-scrub=` option can be used to force or prevent Xen +from mitigating the DIV-leakage vulnerability. By default, Xen will mitigate +DIV-leakage on hardware believed to be vulnerable. + ### sync_console > `= ` diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/entry.S index 0ff4008060..ad5ca50c12 100644 --- xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/entry.S.orig +++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/entry.S @@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ __UNLIKELY_END(nsvm_hap) 1: /* No Spectre v1 concerns. Execution will hit VMRUN imminently. */ .endm ALTERNATIVE "", svm_vmentry_spec_ctrl, X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM + ALTERNATIVE "", DO_SPEC_CTRL_DIV, X86_FEATURE_SC_DIV pop %r15 pop %r14 diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c index e9cc6b586a..f75124117b 100644 --- xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c.orig +++ xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -78,6 +79,7 @@ static int8_t __initdata opt_srb_lock = -1; static bool __initdata opt_unpriv_mmio; static bool __read_mostly opt_fb_clear_mmio; static int8_t __initdata opt_gds_mit = -1; +static int8_t __initdata opt_div_scrub = -1; static int __init parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s) { @@ -132,6 +134,7 @@ static int __init parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s) opt_srb_lock = 0; opt_unpriv_mmio = false; opt_gds_mit = 0; + opt_div_scrub = 0; } else if ( val > 0 ) rc = -EINVAL; @@ -284,6 +287,8 @@ static int __init parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s) opt_unpriv_mmio = val; else if ( (val = parse_boolean("gds-mit", s, ss)) >= 0 ) opt_gds_mit = val; + else if ( (val = parse_boolean("div-scrub", s, ss)) >= 0 ) + opt_div_scrub = val; else rc = -EINVAL; @@ -484,7 +489,7 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk) "\n"); /* Settings for Xen's protection, irrespective of guests. */ - printk(" Xen settings: BTI-Thunk %s, SPEC_CTRL: %s%s%s%s%s, Other:%s%s%s%s%s\n", + printk(" Xen settings: BTI-Thunk %s, SPEC_CTRL: %s%s%s%s%s, Other:%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", thunk == THUNK_NONE ? "N/A" : thunk == THUNK_RETPOLINE ? "RETPOLINE" : thunk == THUNK_LFENCE ? "LFENCE" : @@ -509,6 +514,7 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk) opt_l1d_flush ? " L1D_FLUSH" : "", opt_md_clear_pv || opt_md_clear_hvm || opt_fb_clear_mmio ? " VERW" : "", + opt_div_scrub ? " DIV" : "", opt_branch_harden ? " BRANCH_HARDEN" : ""); /* L1TF diagnostics, printed if vulnerable or PV shadowing is in use. */ @@ -933,6 +939,45 @@ static void __init srso_calculations(bool hw_smt_enabled) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO); } +/* + * The Div leakage issue is specific to the AMD Zen1 microarchitecure. + * + * However, there's no $FOO_NO bit defined, so if we're virtualised we have no + * hope of spotting the case where we might move to vulnerable hardware. We + * also can't make any useful conclusion about SMT-ness. + * + * Don't check the hypervisor bit, so at least we do the safe thing when + * booting on something that looks like a Zen1 CPU. + */ +static bool __init has_div_vuln(void) +{ + if ( !(boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor & + (X86_VENDOR_AMD | X86_VENDOR_HYGON)) ) + return false; + + if ( boot_cpu_data.x86 != 0x17 && boot_cpu_data.x86 != 0x18 ) + return false; + + return is_zen1_uarch(); +} + +static void __init div_calculations(bool hw_smt_enabled) +{ + bool cpu_bug_div = has_div_vuln(); + + if ( opt_div_scrub == -1 ) + opt_div_scrub = cpu_bug_div; + + if ( opt_div_scrub ) + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_DIV); + + if ( opt_smt == -1 && !cpu_has_hypervisor && cpu_bug_div && hw_smt_enabled ) + warning_add( + "Booted on leaky-DIV hardware with SMT/Hyperthreading\n" + "enabled. Please assess your configuration and choose an\n" + "explicit 'smt=' setting. See XSA-439.\n"); +} + static void __init ibpb_calculations(void) { bool def_ibpb_entry = false; @@ -1644,6 +1689,8 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void) ibpb_calculations(); + div_calculations(hw_smt_enabled); + /* Check whether Eager FPU should be enabled by default. */ if ( opt_eager_fpu == -1 ) opt_eager_fpu = should_use_eager_fpu(); diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h index bdb119a34c..d993e06e4c 100644 --- xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h.orig +++ xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h @@ -35,7 +35,8 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_RSB_HVM, X86_SYNTH(19)) /* RSB overwrite needed for HVM XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_SELFSNOOP, X86_SYNTH(20)) /* SELFSNOOP gets used by Xen itself */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_MSR_IDLE, X86_SYNTH(21)) /* Clear MSR_SPEC_CTRL on idle */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_LBR, X86_SYNTH(22)) /* Xen uses MSR_DEBUGCTL.LBR */ -/* Bits 23,24 unused. */ +XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_DIV, X86_SYNTH(23)) /* DIV scrub needed */ +/* Bit 24 unused. */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_VERW_IDLE, X86_SYNTH(25)) /* VERW used by Xen for idle */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_SHSTK, X86_SYNTH(26)) /* Xen uses CET Shadow Stacks */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_IBT, X86_SYNTH(27)) /* Xen uses CET Indirect Branch Tracking */ --- xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h.orig 2023-08-07 14:08:26.000000000 +0200 +++ xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h 2023-11-15 14:50:58.771057793 +0100 @@ -178,6 +178,19 @@ .L\@_verw_skip: .endm +.macro DO_SPEC_CTRL_DIV +/* + * Requires nothing + * Clobbers %rax + * + * Issue a DIV for its flushing side effect (Zen1 uarch specific). Any + * non-faulting DIV will do; a byte DIV has least latency, and doesn't clobber + * %rdx. + */ + mov $1, %eax + div %al +.endm + .macro DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY maybexen:req /* * Requires %rsp=regs (also cpuinfo if !maybexen) @@ -231,6 +244,7 @@ wrmsr .L\@_skip: + ALTERNATIVE "", DO_SPEC_CTRL_DIV, X86_FEATURE_SC_DIV .endm .macro DO_SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_GUEST @@ -277,7 +291,8 @@ #define SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_PV \ ALTERNATIVE "", \ DO_SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_GUEST, X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV; \ - DO_SPEC_CTRL_COND_VERW + DO_SPEC_CTRL_COND_VERW; \ + ALTERNATIVE "", DO_SPEC_CTRL_DIV, X86_FEATURE_SC_DIV /* * Use in IST interrupt/exception context. May interrupt Xen or PV context. --- xen/include/asm-x86/amd.h.orig 2023-11-15 15:16:19.642351562 +0100 +++ xen/include/asm-x86/amd.h 2023-11-15 15:17:10.878437198 +0100 @@ -140,6 +140,17 @@ AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x11, 0x0, 0x0, 0xff, 0xf), \ AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x12, 0x0, 0x0, 0xff, 0xf)) +/* + * The Zen1 and Zen2 microarchitectures are implemented by AMD (Fam17h) and + * Hygon (Fam18h) but without simple model number rules. Instead, use STIBP + * as a heuristic that distinguishes the two. + * + * The caller is required to perform the appropriate vendor/family checks + * first. + */ +#define is_zen1_uarch() (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP)) +#define is_zen2_uarch() boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP) + struct cpuinfo_x86; int cpu_has_amd_erratum(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *, int, ...);